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Abstract 
In this paper we establish six stylized facts related to marriage and work in Latin America and 
present a simple model to account for them. First, skilled women are less likely to be married 
than unskilled women. Second, skilled women are less likely to be married than skilled men. 
Third, married skilled men are more likely to work than unmarried skilled men, but married 
skilled women are less likely to work than unmarried skilled women.  Fourth, Latin American 
women are much more likely to marry a less skilled husband compared to women in other 
regions of the world. Five, when a skilled Latin American woman marries down, she is more 
likely to work than if she marries a more or equally educated man. Six, when a woman marries 
down, she tends to marry the “better” men in that these are men that earn higher wages than 
those explained by the other observable characteristics. We present a simple game theoretic 
model that explains these facts with a single assumption:  Latin American men, but not women, 
assign a greater value to having a stay-home wife.  
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I.  Introduction 
In many countries, including Latin America, the gender gap in education has reversed: women 
are getting more education than men.  In fact, as we report, the cohort in which the education gap 
was closed for the first time was born mostly in the 1950s, so the phenomenon is quite old. The 
US-based literature that tries to explain this fact has focused on the returns to education in the 
marriage market: if there is positive assortative matching, an additional year of schooling will 
translate into a more educated spouse and hence a bigger overall return to one’s own educational 
effort. With these priors, it is thus surprising to find out, as we do in this paper, that skilled Latin 
American women are less likely to be married than unskilled women and this is not true for 
skilled men. Moreover, Latin American women when they marry, have a very high probability of 
doing so with a less skilled spouse. Women who marry “down” tend to work more often than 
women who marry a spouse with equal or more education. And when they marry down, they 
tend to choose the relatively more skilled men in the sense that their wages are higher than would 
be predicted by their other observable characteristics.  
 
A bur geoning l iterature on  marriage m arkets i n  recent  years ha s at tempted  to  provide a  
theoretical basis for the matching behavior of men and women, including under conditions when 
women get more education than men. The empirical evidence on both marriage markets and the 
reversal of the education gap, however, has been focused on the US. In this paper we seek to add 
to the literature on marriage markets and the gender education gap with empirical evidence from 
Latin America.  Using census data for over 40 countries from IPUMS International, we illustrate 
a number of “facts” related to the changing nature of marriage and family as an institution and its 
relationship t o education.  I n pa rticular, we examine t he di fferences i n “matching” behavior 
among skilled and unskilled men and women, while emphasizing to what extent Latin American 
countries seem to follow a distinctive pattern compared to other countries in our sample.  
 
To account for these facts we present a simple model, where we highlight the role played by the 
valuation of  t he  returns t o s taying a t hom e  coupled w ith i ntra-household pow er. W e  will 
conclude with a discussion of how this model can account for our stylized facts and to why these 
results differ from the existing literature on these topics, as in Chiappori et al. (2009).   
 
The simplest explanation is that skilled men in the US and Latin America differ in their valuation 
of the returns to having a stay-home wide vis a vis a working wife, but not so skilled women. US 
skilled men prefer a working skilled wife to a stay-home wife while Latin American men do not. 
Latin American women prefer a skilled husband that agrees for her to work, but Latin American 
men would rather have a low-skilled wife who stays at home. However, a low-skilled husband 
would a gree on a  hi gh  skilled w ife w orking. T he w ife w ill a gree t o  marry a  l ower  skilled 
husband provided his salary is not too low. Otherwise, she would rather stay single. This logic 
explains why we find so many skilled women being single, marrying down and doing so mainly 
with the more productive low skilled men.  
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II.  Data 
 
Data f or t he ana lysis c omes f rom t he  International  Integrated  Public U se M icrodata S eries 
(IPUMS-International). Compiled by the Minnesota Population Center, the IPUMS data includes 
the largest publicly available individual-level census data. It consists of decennial records of 
persons and households. Data for select countries from Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America, 
is available between 1960 and 2005.  
 
We us e t he C ensus da ta t o a nalyze m arriage, e ducation, a nd e mployment be havior a mong 
individuals i n Latin A merican  countries,  as w ell as  ot her count ries t hat ar e i ncluded  in  the 
IPUMS data.  For our analysis, we utilize the most recent wave of the Census available for each 
country.  Since data on income and wages are not available for most Censuses, when possible, 
the C ensus da ta h ave  been c omplemented b y H ousehold S urvey d ata f or  Latin A merican 
countries ha rmonized by   the  Inter-American D evelopment  Bank t hat i nclude w ages  and/or 
income.  
 
We focus our analysis in this paper on individuals aged 30-55. We focus on individuals in this 
age group as they would have already completed their education, and having a broader age group 
allows us to have a significant large sample to average time.  In the following sections, we will 
analyze marriage, education, and employment outcomes of individuals in this age group for each 
country.  T hen, we compile the results for all the countries in our sample to create a country-
level dataset that allows us to show patterns across countries.   
 
In addition to the Census and Household Survey data, we also use data from the 2000 World 
Values S urvey ( WVS) t o s upplement our  a nalysis.  T he W VS da ta i ncludes da ta f rom 
representative na tional s urveys t hat a sk r espondents que stions r elated t o t heir s ociocultural, 
moral, religious and political values. In each country questionnaires are administered to around 
3,000 interviewees. For the purpose of our analysis we use information from the 2000 and 2005 
waves which is provided for 79 and 52 countries, respectively, and we rely on questions related 
to marriage and preferences with respect to the role of women within the household. 
 
 
 
III.  Facts 
 
 
 
Fact #0: “Woman is smarter”: The gender gap in education has essentially reversed 
We first observe that there has been a reversal of the gender gap in education in many countries 
around the world, including in Latin America. This fact has been extensively documented for the 
United States (Goldin 2001, Goldin and Katz 2006) and the OECD countries (OECD 2002).  
However, this is a phenomenon that is taking place in other developed and developing countries 
as well. Figure 1 shows the year of birth of the first cohort in which the gender education gap 
reversed us ing C ensus da ta, w here w e de fine t he g ender e ducation g ap  as t he di fference i n 
average years of schooling between men and women.  Among Latin American countries, we can 5 
observe t hat i n t he 200 0s,  the e ducation g ap h ad not  onl y c losed,  but a lso r eversed f or a ll 
countries in the region except for Bolivia and Mexico. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Year of Birth of First Cohort where Education Gap was closed  
 
Notes: The gender gap is calculated as the difference in average years of schooling between men and women; The 
sample also includes countries where the gender gap in education has not reversed; LAC are in red. 
Source: IPUMS census data 
 
 
Among the determinants of the reversal in the gender education gap in the literature, mainly 
based on the U.S. experience, are changes in labor market opportunities as well as lower cost for 
acquiring education faced by women (i.e., a different endowment of non-cognitive skills that 
makes s taying i n s chool l onger e asier f or w omen) w hich c omplement l ong r un c hanges i n 
technology and social norms (Goldin and Katz 2006). Moreover, increased education can be a 
way for women to face less discrimination.  In Latin America, the reversal appears to be driven 
by increases in education among the most educated (Duryea et al., 2007).  The existing literature 
also documents the high inequality in income, health and education and the more rapid growth of 
tertiary enrollments among the children of richer households in Latin American countries (World 
Bank, 2003). 
 
In this paper, we do not examine the determinants of this change for the countries in our sample, 
but rather we investigate some possible consequences of the change in relative supplies of skilled 6 
individuals on hous ehold formation and organization.   In the traditional literature, educational 
attainment is a significant predictor of women’s family formation patterns (Becker 1971, 1973, 
1991; Rindfuss et al. 1980). In Becker’s (1971) classic model, marriage is based on t he joint 
production of  out puts t hat a re br oadly  related  to “ human a ctivities a nd a spirations”.  In t his 
framework, gains from marriage arise from the division of labor between household and market 
activities, the gains being greater the more complementary are spouses’ characteristics. Gains are 
weighted  against s earch c osts a nd m arket opp ortunities.  T his m odel pr edicts t hat s pouses 
specialize i n m arket a nd hous ehold s ectors a ccording t o t heir c omparative a dvantage. A lso, 
specialization of roles implies greater productivity and “dependence on others for certain tasks”. 
In traditional societies women have relied on men for income and protection whereas men have 
relied on women for the rearing of children and home-related work (Becker 1991, p.43).    
 
In the remainder of the paper we ask whether educational attainment affects the pattern of family 
formation for skilled versus unskilled individuals in an asymmetric way first by looking at how 
the probability of forming a family varies by education level. Then we will focus on the division 
of roles within the household and specific family characteristics.    
 
 
 
 
Fact #1: Clear tendency for skilled women to be less likely to be married than unskilled 
women in LAC (very different from the United States). 
First, we examine the probability that individuals marry given their skill level.  If we consider the 
probability that a skilled individual aged 30-55 (i.e., one who has attained secondary or higher 
levels of education) has of being married
2
 
 relative to the less skilled, we see that skilled women 
tend to be less married than unskilled women.  Moreover, we see an asymmetry between men 
and women. In the Figures 2a and 2b below, we graph the OLS coefficients on the dummies for 
“skilled” in separate regressions for women and men predicting whether someone is married. 
This is the coefficient    from the following regression: 
          (1) 
 
where i denotes an individual. We can see that in 25 countries out of 43, skilled men are more 
likely to be married than unskilled men, whereas this occurs only in 16 countries for women. 
Also, if we focus on t he positive coefficients, the magnitude of the difference is sizeable. The 
probability of the skilled being married for women is below 0.05 i n 15 c ountries out of 16 
(except for the United States where it is equal to 0.11) while for men it is below 0.05 f or 14 
countries and above in the remaining 11.  
 
Interestingly, this phenomenon does not seem to be closely related to income per capita for both 
men and women. In the case of women, developed countries are overrepresented in the group of 
countries in our sample where skilled women are less likely to be married than unskilled, but in 
                                                 
2 We define “being married” as either being legally married or living in cohabitation. There have been 
different attitudes along the income distribution to formalizing unions and these are not issues we want to 
deal with. In addition, divorce has tended to become more available so that the difference between 
married and cohabitation has narrowed.  7 
OECD countries with high levels of GDP per capita (United States, the Netherlands, United 
Kingdom) the probability for skilled women to be married is greater relative to unskilled.   The 
top eight countries where skilled women are less likely to be married are Catholic, whereas 
Communist and former  communist countries are overrepresented among t hose where s killed 
women are more likely to be married. We will investigate later to what extent this may be related 
to differences in policies that make marriage and motherhood compatible with work.  
 
On the other hand, we can see that in most developed countries, skilled men are more likely to be 
married than unskilled and the probability for skilled men to be married is greater in developed 
countries with higher levels of income per capita (Austria, United States, the Netherlands, United 
Kingdom) and former communist countries (Hungary, Romania, Slovenia). We see that Southern 
European count ries  (Italy,  Greece, S pain,  Portugal) a re  countries where skilled men are l ess 
likely to  be married, and Rwanda is the country where skilled men are the least likely to be 
married relative to unskilled. This cohort experienced genocide approximately at the ages 24-49, 
so it appears to be important to understand the social consequences and how this may have 
affected marrying and household formation. On the other hand, in most Communist countries, 
skilled m en ha ve e ither a  pos itive pr obability  of be ing m arried or   a ve ry s mall ne gative 
probability of not being married relative to unskilled. 
 
Latin America presents a distinctive picture with respect to  the other c ountries.  In all  Latin 
American countries in our sample skilled women have a lower probability of being married than 
unskilled women.  Apart from Italy and Spain, the other countries where skilled women are the 
least likely to be married are from Latin America (Bolivia, Panama, Colombia and Mexico). 
Only in Argentina are skilled women more likely to be married than unskilled women, but with a 
low probability, below 0.05. The same phenomenon is not so clear-cut for men.  For some Latin 
American  countries,  skilled  men  are m ore  married  than  unskilled ( Argentina,  Panama, 
Venezuela, Chile), while for others the opposite is true (Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico)  
 
 
Figure 2a. Probability of being married (OLS) – dummy on skilled (Secondary +), Women 
 
 
 
 
 
-.15 -.1 -.05 0 .05 .1 .15
UnitedStates
SouthAfrica
Mongolia
Vietnam
Hungary
Netherlands
Armenia
India
Argentina
Romania
KyrgyzRepublic
Jordan
Belarus
Canada
UnitedKingdom
China
Israel
Rwanda
Palestine
Austria
Malaysia
Kenya
Slovenia
Chile
Philippines
CostaRica
Ghana
France
Iraq
Greece
Ecuador
Guinea
Venezuela
Cambodia
Uganda
Mexico
Portugal
Colombia
Panama
Brazil
Italy
Bolivia
Spain
LAC Other8 
Figure 2b. Probability of being married (OLS) – dummy on skilled (Secondary +), Men 
 
 
 
Marriage rates have traditionally been higher in the United States than in the other developed 
countries ( Stevenson  and W olfers 2007) . H owever, he re w e obs erve t hat t he pr obability of  
marriage f or s killed  individuals r elative to  unskilled  is hi gher in  the  US tha n  in  any ot her 
developed or developing country in our sample. A possible explanation for the recent upsurge in 
the marriage rate among skilled individuals (and women in particular) relies on t he changing 
nature of marriage, which is shifting from a production- to a consumption-based legal union 
benefiting hi ghly s killed i ndividuals m ore t han t hey l ess e ducated c ounterparts ( Isen  and 
Stevenson 2010). However, this explanation does not seem to apply to most countries in our 
sample, and in particular to Latin American countries, where skilled women are less likely to be 
married than unskilled women. Moreover, in Latin America and the majority of the countries in 
our sample, there is an asymmetry by gender: skilled women are more likely to be unmarried 
than unskilled women whereas skilled men are more likely to be married than unskilled men. We 
therefore want to explore this issue further by comparing the likelihood of family formation 
between skilled men and women. 
 
When we look at the World Values Survey question about whether being a housewife is just as 
fulfilling as working for pay, we see that in Argentina and Chile, a lower share of skilled women 
agree with the statement than in other LAC, and the difference between unskilled women and 
skilled women is greater.  These are also the countries where unskilled women are no more 
likely to be married than skilled women.   
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Figure 3. Women who agree that being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay, 
30-55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fact #2: Skilled men are more likely to be married than skilled women 
Next, if we plot the same coefficients   from (1) for the probability of skilled women to be 
married (horizontal axis) against the probability of skilled men to be married (vertical axis) we 
can see whether there is asymmetric behavior between skilled men and skilled women in how 
they marry. In countries above the diagonal, skilled men are more likely to be married than 
skilled women (relative to unskilled men and women), while in countries below the diagonal, 
skilled women are more likely to be married than skilled men.  We can see that most countries 
are above the diagonal.   
 
The graph also allows us to identify the cluster of Latin American countries and compare them to 
the other countries. This cluster of Latin American countries are all above the diagonal, meaning 
that in all these countries, skilled men are more likely to be married than skilled women. We also 
see again that Argentina is an outlier with respect to  the other Latin American countries, as 
skilled women are m ore l ikely t o b e m arried t han uns killed women ( a pos itive coefficient). 
Among the other countries, Southern European countries are concentrated in the bottom left 
corner with low probability of marrying for both skilled men and skilled women. As previously 
noted, on t he other end of the spectrum, the United States exhibits the highest probability for 
both skilled men and women to be married. In two Arab countries (Palestine and Jordan) skilled 
women are more likely to be married than skilled men whereas the opposite holds true for Iraq. 
In African countries, but Rwanda, skilled men are more likely to be married than skilled women.  
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Figure 4. Probability of being married (OLS) – dummy on skilled (Secondary +) for men 
vs. women 
 
 
 
From this and the previous fact we observe that the option value of staying single is greater for 
skilled than unskilled women and for skilled women than skilled men in Latin America, but not 
in other countries like the United States. There is evidence that being skilled and having stable 
employment is a desirable quality for men in the marriage market (Oppenheimer, Kalmijn, & 
Lim, 1997; Rapaport, 1964). On the other hand, there is no c onclusive evidence that the same 
applies to women given the fact that in traditional societies they have not been expected to be the 
main “breadwinner” of the family.  
 
We will not estimate returns to  education due to data limitations in  the census data for most 
countries. Increasing returns to higher education and declining returns to high school education 
have be en found in  almost all  Latin American  countries (for urban ma les, aged 30-50):  the 
highest returns to primary education in Brazil (and lowest in Honduras), to secondary education 
in Brazil (and lowest in Bolivia), the highest returns to higher education in Chile (and lowest in 
Honduras) [Duryea et al. 2003]. Moreover, returns to education have been found to be higher for 
women t han f or m en.  Dougherty ( 2005)  finds t hat e ducation doubl y  affects t he e arnings of  
women. It increases their skills and productivity, and it reduces the gap in male and female 
earnings attributable to discrimination, which accounts for about half of the differential in the 
returns t o s chooling. N ext,  we ex amine how   labor f orce pa rticipation  varies f or m arried 
individuals. 
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Labor Force 
 
Fact #3: Married men are more likely to work than unmarried men, while married women 
are less likely to work than unmarried women. 
 
Next, we examine the labor market behavior of married individuals.  In the figure below, we plot 
the OLS coefficient on a dummy for marital status in separate regressions for men (vertical axis) 
and women (horizontal axis) predicting whether someone is in the labor force after controlling 
for education.  The plotted coefficients are   from the following regression for each individual 
i: 
 
     (2) 
 
We can  see t hat al most al l c ountries a re a bove t he di agonal l ine, m eaning t hat a lmost 
everywhere, married men are more likely to work than married women. Moreover, we see that in 
all countries, married men are more likely to work than unmarried men (positive coefficient), 
while in most countries, married women are less likely to work than unmarried women (negative 
coefficient).  China is only the exception to this.  Given that it is a Communist country, with a 
strict family planning policy and a gender imbalance among the younger cohorts (cite), it would 
be interesting to study these aspects further for the effect on family formation and the division of 
roles within the household. Among countries with a positive probability of female labor force 
participation  of ma rried  women  relative  to  unmarried, w e f ind C ommunist a nd f ormer 
Communist countries (China, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Belarus, Mongolia and Romania). Also, 
in Rwanda the probability for married women to work is positive and this may be related to 
changes i n t he di vision of  l abor w ithin t he ho usehold de termined  by  a m arked  gendercidal 
component the genocide (i.e., predominantly Tutsi and Hutu men were targeted). 
 
In  all  Latin A merica c ountries, m arried w omen ha ve a  l ower pr obability of   working t han 
unmarried a nd t he m agnitude i s  quite c onsiderable: be low  -0.2 f or s even out  of  t en L atin 
American countries we have in our sample. Similarly, the Southern European countries exhibit 
lower labor force participation probability for married women than unmarried, with being for 
Portugal closer to zero than for the other olive-belt countries.   O ther countries with very low 
probabilities for labor force participation of married women relative to unmarried include South 
Asian (India, Malaysia) and Arab countries (Jordan and Palestine). 
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Figure 5. Probability of labor force participation (OLS) for married men vs. women 
(dummy on married, i.e. relative to unmarried) 
 
 
 
 
Country-level regression for Fig. 5: Latin America Dummy on Difference (Prob Married 
Men’s LFP - Prob Married Women’s LFP) 
Latin America 
Dummy 
0.173** 
(0.036) 
 
 
 
As predicted by the production-based household model previously described, we expected that a 
greater share o f married men than m arried women would be employed in the labor market. 
However, we also notice that in some countries the probability for married women to be in the 
labor force is positive. This can be due to the increased labor market returns to education and the 
higher opportunity cost for women not to be in the workforce (Attanasio 2009) but also to a 
change in the organization of the roles within the household. Therefore we are going to examine 
how household are sorted (FACT# 4) and how this may be related to the division of roles within 
the family and in the labor market (FACT# 5)    
 
 
Characteristics of Spouse and Household 
 
We ne xt e xamine t he c omposition of  t he hous ehold a nd t he d egree o f a ssortative m atching 
between spouses. We measure this by comparing spouses’ level of education. We acknowledge 
the importance of other variables that could be good indicators of marital sorting. However, we 
focus on education categories rather than income because a wife’s income may be dependent on 
the husband’s. On the other hand, wages are available for a limited number of countries and will 
be explored later. According to the existing literature, the level of education is a good predictor 
of an individual’s socio-economic status.  
 
So far we have seen that in Latin America, skilled women are less likely to be married than 
unskilled women, and skilled women are less likely to be married than skilled men.  Now we 
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look closer at the matching behavior of women more closely to understand the decision of 
marrying down or not marry at all.   
 
 
 
Fact #4: Skilled LAC women are more likely to marry down than in other countries.   
 
In the graph below, we plot the share of women 30-55 in each country who “marry down” 
(women who have more education than their husband) against the gender education gap in that 
country (average years of schooling of men – average years of schooling of women). We observe 
a clear Latin American pattern: of the countries in our sample, Latin American married women 
“marry down” more than women in other countries.  We can  also see that there seems to be a 
negative relationship between the gender gap and the share of women marrying down, i.e. as the 
gender gap reverses, more married women have more education than their spouses.   
 
In order to  test whether married women in Latin American countries are more likely to  marry 
down than in other countries, we run a country-level regression where we regress the share of 
women marrying down on a dummy for Latin American countries and control for the gender gap 
and GDP.  T he regression results show that the coefficient on t he Latin American dummy is 
positive, indicating that after controlling for the gender gap and GDP, women in Latin American 
countries do have an unusual tendency to marry down.  T he coefficient on t he gender gap is 
negative, confirming that as the gender gap reverses, more married women have more education 
than their spouses. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Share of Wives Marrying Down 
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Table 1. Country-level regression of Share of Women Marrying Down   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 
Fact #5: In LAC, women who marry down are more likely to work than those who marry 
up/same.   
 
Now we look at the labor force participation among women who marry down.  Do women who 
marry down tend to work more than other women or less?  In the figure below, we present the 
coefficients on a dummy for women who marry down (compared to women who marry up or the 
same) predicting labor force participation, after controlling for the woman’s education and her 
husband’s education.  This is   from the following regression for each woman i in a country: 
 
   
(3) 
 
In our sample of countries, which are mostly developing countries, we see that in Latin America, 
women who m arry  down are m ore l ikely t o w ork t han women who  marry up or  t he s ame. 
Meanwhile, in most other countries, including the United States, women who marry down are 
less likely to work (but the coefficient is small and likely not significantly different from 0).  
Women who marry down in Panama, Brazil, and Bolivia are especially more likely to work than 
their counterparts who marry up or the same. 
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Figure 8. Probability of LFP For Wives Marrying down 
 
 
 
Country-level Regression for Figure 8: 
Latin America Dummy on Difference of LFP For Wives Marrying down, controlling for 
GDP (but GDP not significant) 
Latin America 
Dummy 
0.057** 
(0.015) 
 
 
We therefore find a pattern that is consistent with the US pattern highlighted by Chiappori et al. 
(2009) whereby, if married, women are more likely to “marry down”; however we find that this 
seems to be an even more defining characteristic of Latin American countries.  
 
Fact #6: Women who marry down marry the “better” men (higher residual from wage 
regression) 
 
So far we have only considered the education level of the husband a woman is married to.  
However, there are other characteristics of a husband that women care about.  In this section, we 
consider what types of men women who marry down choose.   If they marry down, perhaps they 
marry men who have better labor market outcomes.  To investigate this further, we run the 
following wage regressions separately for the husbands of women who marry down, marry up, 
and marry husbands of the same educational level: 
 
        (4) 
 
After controlling for the husband’s education, we graph the residual   from the wage regression 
– the part of wages that is not explained by education and not observed by us. This may include 
qualities like ability, attractiveness, height, etc.  From the graphs, we see that for all Latin 
American countries, women who marry down marry the “better” men in terms of this residual. 
Residuals from husband wages and their level of significance are reported in the table in the next 
page. 
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Figure 9. Residual from Husband’s Wages 
   
 
    
 
 
 
 
   
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
k
d
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
h
u
s
_
r
e
s
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
x
 Wife>Husband  Wife<Husband
 Wife=Husband
HH Data
ARG (2002): Husband Residuals
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
k
d
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
h
u
s
_
r
e
s
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
x
 Wife>Husband  Wife<Husband
 Wife=Husband
HH Data
CHL (2003): Husband Residuals
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
k
d
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
h
u
s
_
r
e
s
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
x
 Wife>Husband  Wife<Husband
 Wife=Husband
HH Data
COL (2003): Husband Residuals
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
k
d
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
h
u
s
_
r
e
s
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
x
 Wife>Husband  Wife<Husband
 Wife=Husband
HH Data
VEN (2003): Husband Residuals17 
 
Table 2. Residual from Regression Predicting Husband’s Wages 
  
Marry 
Down 
Marry 
Up  Diff  P-value 
Marry 
Same  Diff  P-value 
ARG 2002  0.115  -0.229  0.344  0.000  -0.003  0.118  0.000 
BOL 2002  0.447  -0.102  0.549  0.000  0.007  0.440  0.000 
CHL 2003  0.047  -0.169  0.217  0.000  -0.045  0.093  0.000 
COL 2003  0.148  -0.124  0.273  0.000  0.060  0.088  0.000 
CRI 2004  0.069  -0.133  0.202  0.000  -0.093  0.162  0.000 
DOM 2003  0.097  -0.105  0.202  0.000  0.047  0.050  0.219 
GUA 2002  0.275  -0.026  0.301  0.000  -0.044  0.319  0.002 
HON 2003  0.252  -0.164  0.416  0.000  0.037  0.215  0.000 
JAM 2002  -0.136  -0.195  0.058  0.737  -0.093  -0.044  0.734 
MEX 2004  0.166  -0.142  0.308  0.000  0.038  0.129  0.000 
NIC 2001  0.115  -0.172  0.287  0.000  -0.103  0.217  0.003 
PAN 2003  0.107  -0.189  0.296  0.000  -0.037  0.144  0.000 
PER 2002  0.218  -0.240  0.458  0.000  0.001  0.217  0.000 
PRY 2002  0.103  -0.135  0.238  0.002  0.008  0.095  0.281 
SLV 2002  0.160  -0.136  0.297  0.000  0.007  0.154  0.000 
URY 2003  0.145  -0.089  0.234  0.000  -0.014  0.159  0.000 
VEN 2003  0.069  -0.144  0.213  0.000  0.002  0.067  0.000 
 
 
 
 
IV.  Discussion: Why is Latin America Different? 
 
From our 7 f acts, we see that Latin America appears to be different from other countries with 
regard to the marriage behavior of skilled and unskilled men and women. In this paper, we will 
not attempt to provide a formal explanation for these facts, but we will discuss some possible 
explanations of our findings and why we think they are puzzling. Our explanation will rely on a 
difference with respect to preferences about a wife’s labor force participation 
 
 
1)  Skilled women are more likely to prefer “Working” rather than “Staying-at-home” 
 
Increased Empowerment  
Women are now more educated in Latin America, and in most countries of the region, women 
are more educated than men (Fact #0). This fact and labor market returns to education that are 
higher for women than for men have increased the opportunity cost for women to stay out of the 
workforce.   
 18 
A large literature has shown that women are more risk averse than men in most contexts and 
tasks
3  (e.g., D ohmen  et a l. 2005;   Lusardi a nd  Mitchell 2008;  A rano e t a l. 2010) . T hat i s, 
empirical evidence shows that men and women have different emotional reactions to uncertain 
situations and risk taking, and overall men exhibit greater confidence and risk tolerance
4
 
. Risk 
aversion has also been  found to be decreasing  with education and income levels (Riley and 
Chow 1992). In this regard, marriage has traditionally been perceived by women as a s ort of 
insurance, and as a source of financial security that decreases the “overall variance of a married 
woman’s asset position” (Bertocchi et al. 2010). 
 
Greater Instability Associated with Marriage  
However, the family is not a static institution and significant changes have taken place reshaping 
the nature of marriage and leading to a greater instability associated with it. First of all, divorce 
rates have increased in Latin America (see table 1).  Recent studies have shown that unilateral 
divorce laws have the effect of increasing women’s labor force participation by increasing the 
incentive t o m aintain one ’s out side opt ions a nd t o a cquire m arket s kills ( Stevenson 2008) . 
Moreover, Rasul (2006) shows that marriage rates are lower in the context of unilateral divorce, 
where t he di vorce c an be  r equested b y  either s pouse.  In t his c ontext, di vorce c onsequently 
introduces a greater anticipation of potential instability from marriage.  
 
Divorce laws are quite recent in many Latin American countries (Uruguay passed divorce laws 
in 1907, Mexico in 1917, Argentina in 1954, Brazil and Colombia in 1977, and Chile in 2004, 
(Lew a nd B eleche  2008).  Evidence o f t he c hanges i n l egislation a nd t he e ffects of  t he 
introduction of unilateral divorce are limited to developed countries. However, evidence related 
to developing countries shows that enforcing alimony and child support payments from their ex-
husbands is often more difficult (Goode 1993).  On the other hand, cohabitation is a phenomenon 
increasingly widespread in Latin America. There is no c onclusive evidence on w hether the de 
facto union leads to a lower investment in household production (Stevenson and Wolfers 2006) 
or is just revealing of a preference for a non-institutionalized union. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Recent reviews include Byrnes et al. (1999), Eckel and Grossmann (2008), Croson and Gneezy (2009). 
4 See Croson and Gneezy (2009) for a review of the existing evidence. 19 
Table 3: Changes in the Nature of Marriage for Latin American Women, 30-55 
 
Country  Share of Single 
Women 
Share of Married 
Women 
Share of Divorced 
Women 
  1970  2000  1970  2000  1970  2000 
Argentina  0.12  0.25  0.80  0.62  0.04  0.09 
Bolivia  0.09  0.13  0.78  0.76  0.03  0.06 
Brazil  0.10  0.15  0.77  0.72  0.05  0.08 
Chile  0.15  0.18  0.74  0.71  0.06  0.09 
Colombia  0.14  0.19  0.71  0.65  0.09  0.10 
Costa Rica  0.15  0.15  0.76  0.73  0.05  0.11 
Ecuador  0.11  0.14  0.78  0.74  0.05  0.09 
Mexico    0.10    0.77    0.08 
Panama  0.09  0.11  0.75  0.71  0.13  0.15 
Venezuela  0.15  0.16  0.70  0.68  0.09  0.13 
Note: The first and last wave of data available in each Census is used for each country.  
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2)  Men differ across countries with respect to their preferences about their wife’s labor 
force participation 
 
Traditional Roles within the Household 
One assumption in the recent literature on m atching is that roles in the household are gender 
neutral.  However, since we observe that women in LAC do t end to marry down, we consider 
whether traditional roles for men and women persist in LAC than in the US, for example.   Using 
data from the WVS question about whether someone agrees that you “need children to be self-
fulfilled” we see that LAC is very different from the US.  In LAC, having children remains an 
aspiration for a greater share of women in Latin America, whereas a much lower share of women 
in the United States agree that they need children to be self-fulfilled.  Surprisingly, we observe 
that a lower share of women in Latin America find housework as fulfilling as working in the 
labor market than in the US.  
 
 
Table 4: Women’s Preferences, Labor Force Participation and Having Children 
  
Being a housewife just as fulfilling 
as working for pay  Need children to be self-fulfilled 
Country 
% skilled 
women 
% 
unskilled 
women 
difference 
% skilled 
women 
% 
unskilled 
women 
difference 
Argentina  40.51  56.33  -15.82  36.67  59.24  -22.57 
Chile  41.03  60.10  -19.07  57.14  62.61  - 5.47 
Mexico  67.44  81.14  -13.70  28.89  51.21  -22.32 
Peru  60.39  57.72  + 2.67  38.73  46.41  - 7.68 
Venezuela        49.58  61.31  -11.73 
Spain  53.85  55.33  - 1.48  34.92  42.93  - 8.01 
USA  81.82  70.80  +11.02  12.05  16.89  - 4.84 
Note: share of women who either “strongly agree” or “agree”; data are only available for a limited 
number of Latin American countries. 
Source: World Value Surveys (2000, 2005) 
 
 
For m en, w e us e t he  WVS que stions a bout  whether b eing a  hous ewife jus t a s f ulfilling a s 
working for pa y and  whether a w orking mother can have good r elationship as non-working 
mother.  We see that for the most part, men in LAC countries are more likely to strongly agree 
that being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay.  Meanwhile, they are more likely 
to strongly disagree that a working mother can have a good relationship with her children as a 
non-working mother. 
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Table 5. Men’s Preferences, Women Working Outside of the Home 
  
Being a housewife 
just as fulfilling as 
working for pay 
A working mother can have 
good relationship as non-
working mother 
   % Strongly Agree  % Strongly Disagree 
Argentina  20.02  6.19 
Chile  33.23  5.64 
Mexico  36.9  10.37 
Peru  17.53  1.92 
Venezuela  42.38  15.99 
Spain  23.59  3.41 
Canada  26.57  1.73 
USA  22.91  3.94 
Source: World Value Surveys (2000) 
 
 
We consider the possibility that men in Latin American countries prefer skilled women to stay at 
home due to the existence of some traditional social norms that the lead to gendered roles in the 
household, whereas men in the U.S. prefer skilled women to work outside of the home so that 
they can have a greater income and higher levels of joint consumption. Moreover, we assume 
that educated women in both countries prefer to work rather than staying home. This is because 
higher labor market returns to education for women have increased the opportunity  cost for 
women to stay out of the workforce.  We assume that there is an increased utility for educated 
women to work which is related to the fact that educated would pursue a “career” as opposed to 
having a low-skilled “job”. This difference with respect to the men and women’s preference of a 
wife’s labor force participation is enough to change the equilibrium of the matching process. 
 
We as sume t hat t here ar e s ome ga ins as sociated  with  marriage  and  these ar e r elated  to  the 
spouse’s level of schooling and earning capacity, to some returns for the woman to stay at home, 
and the pleasure of being matched. Specifically the three factors we are going to consider are:  
 
•  Earning capacity (wages) 
Skilled individuals earn a wage h 
Unskilled individuals earn a wage l 
 
Where: h>l 
 
•  Returns to “stay at home” 
Rw: women’s return to “stay at home” 
Rm: men’s return of wives’ “staying at home” 
 
Where:  Rw < Rm 22 
Because of women’s disutility from housework (e.g., cooking: both spouses enjoy but 
women also make the effort of cooking) 
 
•  Balance of Power within the Household 
Monetary income gets distributed as a domestic bargain that has to do with the relative 
outside option of each partner. Consider Π to be the share of household monetary income 
appropriated by the husband.  
Πss: if both spouses are skilled 
Πuu: if both spouses are unskilled 
Πus: if man is unskilled and woman is skilled 
Πsu: if man is skilled and woman is unskilled 
 
Where: 
 
Πsu> Πss 
 
Πuu> Πus 
 
We assume that Πij is not dependent on whether the wife stays at home or works. This is 
a s trong  assumption t hat m akes our  r esult h arder t o obt ain. T his i s s o be cause i f a  
working woman’s outside option is greater if she works than if she stays at home, then 
she may want to work because it improves her power within the household but that is the 
reason why men would rather have her stay at home. We assume away this effect in this 
first discussion. We also assume that there is no gender discrimination in the labor market 
so that the outside options are symmetric for both spouses. More simply, let us assume:  
 
Πss=1/2 
Πuu=1/2 
Πsu>1/2 
Πus<1/2 
 
 
 
We a ssume t hat m en c an be  s killed or  uns killed, m arried or  s ingle, b ut t hey a lways w ork, 
whereas women can be skilled or unskilled, married or single but they can either work or stay at 
home.  Individuals maximize the following utility function: 
 
U (WΠ, R) 
 
Where W is the wage level (i.e., high or low as previously described), Π is the control over 
wages which depends on the bargaining process within the household, which is related to their 
income earning potential outside of the union, and hence on t heir relative skill level. R is the 
gender-specific return from the wife staying at home.  
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The payoff matrix for men and women can be represented as follows: 
 
    Marry a Skilled Woman  Marry an Unskilled Woman 
  Remain 
Single 
Work  Stay Home  Work  Stay Home 
Skilled 
Man 
h 
 
2h Πss 
[2h(1-Πss)] 
 
 
(h + Rm)Πss 
[(h + Rw)(1-Πss)] 
 
(h + l) Πsu 
[(h + l) (1-Πsu)] 
(h + Rm)Πsu 
[(h + Rw) (1-Πsu)] 
Unskilled 
Man 
l  (l+h) Πus 
[(l+h) (1-Πus)] 
 
 
(l + Rm)Πus 
[(l + Rw)(1-Πus)] 
 
2l Πuu 
[2l(1-Πuu)] 
 
(l + Rm)Πuu 
[(l + Rw)(1-Πuu)] 
 
Note: Payoffs for women are in parentheses 
 
 
We show what conditions determine matching outcomes.  
 
 
•  A skilled man would prefer a stay-at-home skilled wife if: 
 
(h + Rm)Πss > 2h Πss 
 
Which implies that a skilled man prefers a skilled stay-at-home wife if he values the 
returns from a stay-at-home wife more than her wage, thus if: 
 
Rm>h 
 
   
•  A skilled man would prefer an unskilled stay-at-home wife to a skilled working wife if: 
 
(h + Rm)Πsu > 2h Πss 
 
Which simplifies to:  
 
Rm >  2h Πss (1/ Πsu) – h    
where  2h Πss (1/ Πsu) – h   < h since (Πss / Πsu)<1 
 
Note that this is less stringent than: Rm>h 
 
Two issues are highlighted by these conditions: it is not just the valuation of h vs Rm but 
also the fact that marrying an unskilled woman implies greater control over the resources 
of the household since Πss < Πsu.  24 
 
 
•  A skilled woman prefers to work rather than being married and staying at home with a 
skilled man if: 
 
2h(1-Πss) > (h + Rw)(1-Πss) 
 
Which implies that a skilled woman prefers to work if her wage is greater than her returns 
from being a stay-at-home wife, that is if: 
 
h>Rw 
 
•  A skilled woman who marries an unskilled man prefers to work rather than staying at 
home with an unskilled man if: 
 
(h+l) (1-Πus) > (Rw + l)(1-Πus) 
 
Which implies that a skilled woman prefers to work if her wage is greater than her returns 
from being a stay-at-home wife, that is if: 
 
h>Rw 
 
 
•  A skilled woman prefers to marry an unskilled man and to work rather than remaining 
single if: 
 
(l+h) (1-Πsu)> h 
 
Which means that a woman would be willing to “marry down” (i.e., marry a man with a 
lower l evel o f edu cation) i f t he w age di fferential can  be com pensated b y h er  greater 
power in the household: 
 
 
(1-
us
us
π
π ) 1 ( −
) > 
l
h
 
 
 
We assume men and women are symmetric, but they differ with respect to their returns from a 
stay-at-home w ife, w here R m>Rw  being hous ework a ssociated w ith a  c ost f or w omen ( i.e., 
opportunity cost and effort).  
 
Therefore, in the setting described above, the Nash-equilibrium is the following: 
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•  The s killed m an w ould m arry a n uns killed w oman w ho s tays a t hom e i f t he s killed 
woman would rather work than stay at home, provided that: 
 
Rm> h ( 1 −
su
ss
π
π
) 
 
 
 
•  The skilled woman would marry an unskilled man rather than staying single if the utility 
arising f rom t he hous ehold ba lance of  pow er i s g reater t han t he w age di fferential 
(condition previously shown). 
 
 
•  The unskilled man would marry a skilled woman who works if her earning capacity is 
high enough to compensate him from the loss of bargaining power within the household: 
 
h > (1/ Πus -1) l  
 
 
 
•  The unskilled woman would marry a skilled (or unskilled) man and stay at home rather 
than remaining single if: 
 
Rw > l 
 
Which is less stringent than Rw > h a s an unskilled woman, all else equal, has a lower 
labor market opportunity cost than a skilled woman 
 
 
 
To explain the puzzle in our facts we assume that men in Latin America and the U.S. differ with 
respect to their preference about their wife’s labor force participation where:  
 
Latin American men prefer a stay-at-home wife than a working wife: 
 
Rm>h  
 
 
Whereas for American men: 
 
Rm<h 
 
 
This leads to an entirely different matching equilibrium. In the US a skilled man wants to marry 
a skilled woman and have her work, which also happens to be her best option. By contrast, in 
Latin America, a skilled woman would also rather marry a skilled man and work, but men would 26 
rather marry an unskilled woman who stays at home. So a skilled woman is left with the option 
of remaining single and working, marrying an unskilled man who will allow her to work or 
marrying a skilled man who requires that she stay at home. Given these options, she would rather 
marry a low skilled man provided his income is not too low, but otherwise, she would rather stay 
single.  
 
These conditions help explain why we observe so few skilled Latin American women marrying 
skilled men and when they do so, they tend to stay at home. By contrast, they marry down more 
frequently and when they do so, they both work and tend to marry the “better” men. Otherwise, 
they are better off staying single.  
 
 
 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
We observe that the marriage market in Latin America shows very different patterns than those 
observed elsewhere, and especially those observed in the US, where much of the literature has 
been focused. We have shown that educated women in Latin America are less likely to  get 
married, and when they marry, they are more likely to marry someone with a lower level of 
education. When women marry a less skilled man, they are more likely to work than when they 
marry an equally or more highly skilled man. Moreover, when women marry a less skilled man 
they tend to marry the  “better” men in that these men earn a higher income than would be 
expected given their other observables.  
 
To account for the differences in behavior we observe, we require mainly a difference in the 
valuation of the returns to a skilled woman staying at home. Latin men value their return from 
staying at home more than their market wage but women disagree. Because of this, men would 
rather marry down and have their wife stay at home. Women would rather marry down and work 
if the husband’s income earning potential is high enough, but would rather stay single otherwise.  
 
We have assumed that power depends on potential income rather than actual income, so that a 
woman’s power does not depend on whether she works or not. But if we relax this assumption, it 
may be that a woman’s return from work is not just her income but also her increased power 
within the household. This only helps strengthen our effect, but would not help distinguish Latin 
America from other regions.  
 
Positive a ssortative m atching i s a ssumed a s a n e xogenous pr eference i n t he  literature on 
marriage markets in  the US, but even if it e xisted, it may not overwhelm other considerations 
such as intra-household power and the different perception of the returns from staying at home 
for husbands and wives. To explain our results we not only need that Latin men have different 
preferences than US men in the sense that the former consider Rm>h while the latter have Rm<h. 
It is also the case that Latin women tend to disagree because they value Rw<h where Rm>Rw. 
This wedge would grow if there is a difference in the woman’s household power depending on 
whether she actually works or not, as her human capital may erode if she stays at home as argued 
in Attanasio et al. (2009).  27 
 
We note that programs that make it easier for women to work, such as day care centers, would 
probably tend to cause greater female labor force participation, ceteris paribus, but it would also 
imply that disagreements within the household over the advantages of staying at home would 
increase. If these policies do not affect the return of a stay home wife relative to a man, they may 
not affect the marriage market equilibrium.  
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